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Abstract
The model presented in this paper captures some of the eﬀects of
a pre-electoral debate on the incentives for information acquisition of
voters that belong to diﬀerent ideological strands. We introduce the
option to publicly share information into a fairly standard model of
information aggregation through an election with costly information
acquisition. We ﬁnd that this option dramatically changes the incen-
tive to acquire information. Without the option to share one’s signal
no extremist has any incentive to acquire information. With this op-
tion present the extremists’ incentive to acquire information is even
stronger than the independents’ incentive. In equilibrium this extra
incentive leads the extremists acquire more information than the inde-
pendents. We use this to explain the empirically observed correlation
between extremism and information.
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11 Introduction
In most economic models of elections voters act as if they are in a box; they
are fed information about the electorate, they might choose to pay for some
information about the election, and then vote. In this context a voter that
has extreme preferences about the outcome of an election may never want to
buy any information since it will have little or no inﬂuence on their voting
decision. This can lead to a prediction that more extreme voters will be less
informed.1 It turns out that there is strong evidence that voters with more
extreme views actually tend to be better informed. Indeed this is one of the
main conclusions of “The Relationship between Information, Ideology, and
Voting Behavior” by Palfrey and Poole (1987) as well as a host of papers
in the literature on political psychology (see for example Sidanius (1988)
and the references cited therein). In the model presented here we attempt
to explain this correlation by allowing voters to partake in a pre-electoral
debate.
While pre-electoral debates have been for the most part overlooked in the
political economics literature it seems that they play an important role in the
democratic process. Debates and discussions about the running candidates
are among the most common features of political life as we know it. In fact,
according to The American National Election Studies (ANES) poll in 2004,
34% of respondents reported yes to the question, “During the campaign,
did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for
or against one of the parties or candidates?”(The National Election Studies
2004). This desire to persuade could lead to the desire to be more informed,
and so a model of information acquisition before an election without some
form of communication between voters seems incomplete. Introducing such
an option to share one’s information before an election should change the
incentive structure of voter’s decisions to acquire information. Our aim in
this paper is to highlight the eﬀects that communication might have on a
model of information acquisition in an election.
This is not the ﬁrst study that suggests that political information has
other uses than just the guidance it provides for a voter’s private voting
decision. In Baron (2004)’s model of media bias voters use political infor-
1This setup is used often, and the theoretical result that extremists are less likely to
acquire information has been shown in Oliveros (2006) and Degan (2006).
2mation for private investment and consumption decisions. In Bernhardt,
Krasa and Polborn (2006) information is modeled as a consumption good:
people read or watch for fun. Neither one of these two rationales can ex-
plain the correlation between extremism and information. In Bernhardt et
al. (2006) it is simply assumed that extremists assign a higher consumption
value to information. It is unclear how one could generate a correlation
between information and extremism when political information is acquired
for the sake of private decisions as in Baron (2004).
To examine at the eﬀects of a pre-electoral debate we incorporate a com-
munication stage into a standard Condorcetian model of an election with
costly information acquisition.2 There are two equally probably states l,r
and two candidates L,R, such that every voter (weakly) prefers candidate
X to candidate Y in state x. To make any statements about the relation
between information and extremism it is assumed that information is en-
dogenous and that there are voters of varying degrees of extremism in the
electorate.3 There are three diﬀerent camps of voters in the model: left
extremists, right extremists and independents.4 There can be two types
of mistakes that an electorate can make: choosing candidate L in state r,
and vice versa. The voters in this paper diﬀer by their views of mistakes,
however they do not diﬀer in how much they care about the election in
general. We call a left wing extremist a voter who suﬀers serious disutil-
ity from the mistake of choosing the right wing candidate when the correct
decision would have been to choose the left wing candidate, and loses no
utility from the opposite mistake. We call a right wing extremist a voter
who is characterized by exactly the opposite preference structure. These
voters are extremists because they will always weakly prefer the electorate
to choose the extremist’s candidate as they do not care if the that candidate
2By standard Condorcetian model we refer to the model set forth by Austin-Smith and
Banks (1996) that has been the basis of much work in the literature.
3An alternative and very diﬀerent approach to explain the correlation would be to
let extremism be endogenously explained by varying levels of information. Palfrey and
Poole (1987) suggest such an explanation. Sidanius’ “context theory” sees in “cognitive
orientation” an exogenous factor that explains both a persons extremism and his or her
investment in information acquisition (Sidanius 1988)
4By extremist we do not mean to imply activist or irrational voter. We merely mean
that this person is ideologically stubborn and no amount of information would convince
them to change their views. In this sense our extremists are the same as partisans in
Oliveros (2006) and Degan (2006)
3is a mistake or not. We call independents those that have an average loss
if either type of mistake is made.5 These voters bring no ideological bias to
the table and only wish to minimize the probability of a mistake.
In the model voters ﬁrst have to decide whether to acquire a costly
signal on the state of the world. It is assumed that signals are independent
conditionally on the state. None of the extremists would have any incentive
to acquire costly information if voters had to only decide whether to acquire
(private) information and how to vote. In such a model extremists would
always vote for their preferred candidate and would consequently have no
incentive to acquire information.6
The introduction of a pre-electoral debate is the crucial innovation in
this model. Once a voter has acquired a signal they then decide whether to
reveal their private signal. A “debate” consists of the simultaneous publica-
tion of the signals from those voters that choose to reveal their information.
This option to share information signiﬁcantly changes the incentive structure
for information acquisition. The optimal voting strategy of any extremist
remains unchanged. However, they now have a chance to use their knowl-
edge of politics to convince some of the independent voters to vote for their
preferred candidate.
To close the model an assumption on the number of voters is needed. It
is assumed that the total number of voters is a Poisson random variable.7
This creates a situation in which voters neither know the number of other
voters nor do they know the exact proportion of voters in any of the three
camps.
Our main result is that equilibria with communication8 exist, and in all
of these equilibria extremists have strictly higher beneﬁt from information
acquisition than independents and therefore are always at least as likely
as independents to acquire information. Indeed, under certain parameters
5That the independents suﬀer only an average loss from either mistake assures that we
are not driving the results of the model by giving some voters undue incentive for action
compared to the rest of the electorate.
6This is in fact a result in models with endogenous information acquisition and voters
of varying degrees of extremism, see Oliveros (2006), Degan (2006).
7Formally this places the model in the literature on Poisson games as developed by
Myerson (1998) and Myerson (1997).It turns out that the analysis of the present model
is considerably simpliﬁed by the setup as a Poisson game. This will be described in the
section on the solution of this game.
8see section (3) for a deﬁnition of this communication equilibrium
4the only voters that acquire information are extremists, and the rest of the
electorate just free rides.9 This stands in stark contrast to the political
economics literature which has had a hard time explaining any acquisition
of information by extremists. The ﬁrst result gives some intuition as to
why Palfrey and Poole (1987) ﬁnd that extremism is correlated with being
informed, and we believe that we are the ﬁrst to explore this result theoret-
ically.10
Another observation of Palfrey and Poole (1987) is that more informed
voters are less likely to abstain, which has been theoretically explained by
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and a large literature following that. One
result of our paper is the existence of what we call a “swing voters boon”
in which compared to a non-pivotal voter, a pivotal independent voter has
more incentive to vote for the candidate that the other independents are
voting for. Since this feature of our model exists and there is no cost of
voting, voters never want to abstain. As such we cannot tie the two results
of Palfrey and Poole (1987) together into one uniﬁed theory.
2 The Model
We deﬁne an extended Poisson game following Myerson (1998) {Ω,α,T,n,p,C,U}
with the state space Ω = {l,r} and a common prior of α = 1
2 that the state
is l. The parameter T denotes the set of voter types T = T1 × T2 where
t1 ∈ T1 = {l,i,r} denotes the preference type of a voter and t2 ∈ T2 = {l,r}
denotes the informational type of a voter. The size of the electorate is a Pois-
son random variable with mean n. For each state of the world ω ∈ {l,r}
the preference and information type of a voter are drawn from independent
9This result is related to Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) in which an interested party
may prefer having opposing extremist advocates instead of investing in information herself
(especially the section on veriﬁable information). The setup of that model however is quite
diﬀerent insofar as the advocates have no decision making power and no intrinsic interest
in the outcome of the principal’s decision. Instead the principal has to optimally select
advocates and devise a payment scheme to motivate the advocates to action.
10As far as we could discern the only work that allows for endogenous information ac-
quisition as well as pre-electoral communication is Gerardi and Yariv (2004). They show
that incentives for information acquisition have to be traded oﬀ against eﬃcient informa-
tion aggregation when designing an optimal voting rule. Their work diﬀers from ours in
their goal (they are interested in optimal committee design whereas we are interested in
informational dynamics of an electorate) as well as their communication structure.
5distributions p1(·|ω) and p2(·|ω) respectively. We assume that the prefer-
ence type of a voter is independent of the state of the world, and that any
voter is equally likely to be or preference type l or r, we let p1(t1 = l|ω) =
p1(t1 = r|ω) = η < 1
2 for ω = l,r. We assume that n(1 − 2η) > 1 which
amounts to a very weak statement of the requirement that the electorate is
“large”. Finally the informational type t2 of a voter depends on the state of
the world, we assume that p2(t2 = l|ω = l) = p2(t2 = r|ω = r) = p > 1
2.
The game proceeds according to the following time-line: First Nature
draws a state of the world and an electorate. Secondly voters choose whether
to acquire information. Thirdly voters choose whether to publish their in-
formation. Fourth voters learn the value of all the information that has been
published. Fifth the Supreme Court throws a fair coin which can come up
R or L. Sixth voters vote for L or R.
The information acquisition stage is modeled very simply. A voter has
to decide whether to learn his informational type t2 or not. If he chooses to
learn his type he will incur a ﬁxed cost c > 0. We denote a voter’s decision to
become informed by x1 = 1, otherwise we write x1 = 0. In essence a voter’s
informational type is an informative signal on the state of the world. This
is owed to the assumption that p2(t2 = l|ω = l) = p2(t2 = r|ω = r) = p > 1
2.
From this point on we refer to t2 as the informed voter’s signal.
The exchange of information is modelled as a persuasion game follow-
ing Glaezer and Rubenstein (2001), Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Shin
(1994). An informed voter can decide to either share his signal t2 with the
electorate as a whole, or he can stay silent. He cannot lie, reveal partial
truths, or communicate with subsets of the entire electorate. The electorate
learns the total number of l and r signals that have been published, denoted
by the vector ~ s = (sr,sl). No voter learns anything beyond that. This
implies in particular that voters do not learn the total number of voters, or
the number of voters in any of the camps. They also do not learn how many
signals have been acquired.
In the voting stage voters have to pick between R and L.11 The vote is
decided by majority rule. In case of a tie the Supreme Court picks on the
behalf of independent voters, meaning that the Court picks the candidate
11We will show in section 7 that not considering abstention is without loss of generality
in the context of the present model, in the sense that we would obtain the same equilibrium
result if we where to allow voter’s to abstain.
6whom an independent would like better given all the information contained
in the public signal vector ~ s. If this does not yield a clear cut result then
the Supreme Court picks the candidate that was determined by the fair coin
toss in the ﬁfth stage.
The utility of a voter depends on the outcome of the vote W = L or
R (which in turn depends the votes of all voters and in case of a tie on ~ s)
his decision whether to acquire information or not (x1 ∈ {0,1}), the state
of the world and his preference type. We have that: U : {L,R} × {0,1} ×
{l,i,r} × {l,r} → R:
U(W,x1,t1,ω) =

  
  
−δ(t1) − x1c if ω = r and W = L
−(1 − δ(t1)) − x1c if ω = l and W = R
−x1c otherwise
The preference type of a voter, t1, determines the disutility a voter incurs
when candidate X is picked in state y. For leftist voters we have that
δ(l) = 0. A leftist does not receive any disutility from a wrong choice of
candidate L however he receives the maximal disutility when candidate R
wins the election in state l. Conversely we set δ(r) = 1, so a rightist’s utility
is minimized when L wins in state r. Finally we assume that independents
suﬀer an equal amount of disutility from either mistake, δ(i) = 1
2.
3 Strategies and Equilibrium
The strategy set of a voter C = C1×C2×C3 is composed of an information
acquisition-strategy C1 = {0,1} a broadcasting strategy C2 = (L × R) and
a voting-strategy C3 = {f : N0 × N0 × T → {L,R}} where f is allowed
to depend on T2 only if the voter chose to acquire information in the ﬁrst
step. The broadcasting strategy consists of two elements: L = {∅,l} is the
choice to broadcast a signal with value l, and R = {∅,r} is the decision to
broadcast a signal with value r, in each case ∅ stands for the suppression of
the signal. C3 is the set of all voting rules given vector of broadcast signals
~ s and a voter’s preference type t1 and his informational t2 if he chose to
acquire information. A typical pure strategy is denoted as a vector x with
x1 ∈ {0,1} as the voter’s decision whether to acquire information or not,
(x2,x3) as the voter’s broadcasting strategy and x4 as the voter’s voting rule.
7The vector x = (1,∅,r,f), for instance, denotes the strategy in which the
voter acquires information, only broadcasts r signals and follows a voting
rule f.
We denote a mixed strategy of a a voter of type t1 by τt1. We deﬁne
τ = (τl,τi,τr) as a mixed strategy proﬁle for the game. So τl(0,∅,∅,f), for
example, denotes the probability that a leftist does not acquire information,
never shares his signal and follows the voting rule f. We deﬁne τt1(·,l,r,f)
as the probability that a voter of type t1 passes on both signals and plays
voting strategy f. Formally τt1(·,l,r,f) = τt1(0,l,r,f) + τt1(1,l,r,f), the
expressions τt1(·,·,r,f), τt1(·,l,r,·) and so forth are deﬁned analogously.
We deﬁne EUt1(τ,x) as the expected utility of a voter of preference type t1
when this voter uses the pure strategy x while all other voters follow the
proﬁle τ. The probability that the state is r and candidate L wins when
all other voters follow strategy τ and the voter under consideration follows
strategy x is denoted by Pr(L,r|τ,x). Conversely the probability that the
state if l and R wins when the voter uses the pure strategy x and all other
voters follow the strategy proﬁle τ is denoted by Pr(R,l|τ,x). Given these
deﬁnitions we can express the expected utility of a voter of type t1 EUt1(τ,x)
as follows:
EUt1(τ,x) = −δ(t1)Pr(L,r|τ,x) − (1 − δ(t1))Pr(R,l|τ,x) − cx1. (1)
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy proﬁle τ is an equilibrium if
1. EUt1(τ,x) ≥ EUt1(τ,y) for all x ∈ C : τt1(x) > 0, y ∈ C, t1 ∈ T1.
2. The strategy proﬁle is symmetric in the sense that extremists of both
camps are equally likely not to acquire any information, we have that
τl(0,·,·,·) = τr(0,·,·,·).
3. The independents will reveal any signal that they acquire, we have that
τi(1,l,∅,f) = τi(1,∅,r,f) = τi(1,∅,∅,f) = 0 for all f ∈ C2.
4. Voters vote sincerely.
The ﬁrst condition says that any strategy that a voter plays with a
positive probability in τ has to be a best response to the strategy proﬁle τ.
8This is Roger Myerson’s deﬁnition of an equilibrium in an extended Poisson
game (Myerson 1998). This deﬁnition alone does not rule out certain odd
behaviors. A proﬁle τ that prescribes that all voters vote L if more than 2
signals have been sent can be an equilibrium proﬁle. In this case voters can
infer that there are more than 2 voters in the electorate. So no voter has a
chance to change the outcome of the vote.
To deal with such problems we require conditions 2, 3 and 4. An impor-
tant question arises: is the set of all 4 conditions compatible? For example,
it is well known that sincere and strategic voting need not coincide. It turns
out that it is straightforward to show that the second requirement is com-
patible with the ﬁrst. This cannot be said of the latter two requirements:
The most involved proofs in this paper are devoted to showing that the third
and fourth requirements are compatible with the ﬁrst as in sections 7 and
8.
4 Voting Strategies
4.1 Sincere Voting
Sincere voting requires a voter to vote for the candidate whom he would
choose if he alone had to determine the winner based on all information
available to him. We deﬁne Pr[~ s,x1t2|ω] as the probability that the signal
vector and the voters own information is ~ s,x1t2 in state ω, where x1t2 is
equal to 0 if x1 = 0 meaning that the voter has no private information
beyond the public vector of signals and x1t2 = t2 for the case that the
voter has private information that is the case x1 = 1. We calculate a voters
expected utility of candidates L, R when the information available to the
voter is the signal vector ~ s and the voter’s own private information x1t2
respectively as
−δ(t1)
Pr[~ s,x1t2|r]
Pr[~ s,x1t2|l] + Pr[~ s,x1t2|r]
(2)
−(1 − δ(t1))
Pr[~ s,x1t2|l]
Pr[~ s,x1t2|l] + Pr[~ s,x1t2|r]
. (3)
9If candidate L is chosen only one type of mistake matters: namely the
case that L is chosen in state r. To obtain a voter’s expected utility the
probability of this mistake has to be multiplied with the disutility that this
voter receives if L is chosen in state r, this disutility is −δ(t1). Analogously
we obtain the expected utility of candidate R given ~ s,x1t2,t1.
Voting sincerely requires a voter to vote for candidate L if expression 2
is larger than expression 3. If the opposite inequality holds true a voter
that votes sincerely has to vote for candidate R. If the two expressions are
equal the voter is indiﬀerent between the two candidates. We assume that
indiﬀerent voters base their vote on the coin thrown by the Court, if the
coin comes up on X they vote for X.
4.2 Extremists
Observe that Pr[~ s,x1t2|ω] 6= 0 for all possible signal proﬁles (~ s,x1t2) and
both states ω = l,r. Our assumption that extremists vote sincerely implies
the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium all leftists vote for candidate L and rightists vote
for candidate R.
Proof Expression 2 equals to 0 if δ(t1) = 0. On the other hand for no
vector (~ s,x1t2) does the probability Pr(~ s,x1t2|l) equal 0. So expression 3
is always negative for a leftist. Consequently expression 2 is larger than
expression 3 for any (~ s,x1t2). A leftist votes sincerely if he votes for L. The
same argument holds mutatis mutandum for for a rightist. 
4.3 Independents
We show next that in equilibrium the independent voters vote according to
a simple cutoﬀ rule.
Lemma 2 There exists a cutoﬀ g(n,η,p,τ) such that an independent voter
votes for L if sl > sr + g(n,η,p,τ) and votes for R if sl < sr + g(n,η,p,τ),
otherwise the independent is indiﬀerent.
Proof We need to show that
Pr[~ s,x1t2|l] > Pr[~ s,x1t2|r] (4)
10if and only if sl > sr + g(n,η,p,τ) for some expression g(n,p,τ).
If the voter has not invested in information acquisition, that is if x1t2 = 0,
then we have that
Pr[~ s,tx2|l] =
e−npSl[npSl]sl
sl!
·
e−n(1−p)Sr[n(1 − p)Sr]sr
sr!
Pr[~ s,tx2|r] =
e−n(1−p)Sl[n(1 − p)Sl]sl
sl!
·
e−npSr[npSr]sr
sr!
for
Sl = η[τl(1,l,∅,·) + τl(1,l,r,·) + τr(1,l,∅,·) + τr(1,l,r,·)]
+(1 − 2η)[τi(1,l,∅,·) + τi(1,l,r,·)]
Sr = η[τl(1,∅,r,·) + τl(1,l,r,·) + τr(1,∅,r,·) + τr(1,l,r,·)]
+(1 − 2η)[τi(1,∅,r,·) + τi(1,l,r,·)]
Observe that expression 2 is larger than expression 3 if and only if
Pr[~ s|l]
Pr[~ s|r]
= (
p
1 − p
)[sl−sr] · e[n(1−2p)(Sl−Sr)] < 1 (5)
we can rearrange to ﬁnd the cutoﬀ condition
sl <
n(2p − 1)
ln(
p
1−p)
(Sl − Sr) + sr (6)
which is always well deﬁned in the given environement. If equation 6 holds
with equality then the voter is indiﬀerent.
We next need to show that an independent voter that has observed a
signal follows the same rule when voting sincerely. To see this assume that
the voter has observed an l-signal. So the public signal count without his
signal then becomes sl − 1 and sr. In this case the voter estimates the
probabilities Pr[~ s,tx2|l] and Pr[~ s,tx2|r] as
Pr[~ s,tx2|l] = p
e−npSl[npSl](sl−1)
(sl − 1)!
·
e−n(1−p)Sr[n(1 − p)Sr]sr
sr!
Pr[~ s,tx2|r] = (1 − p)
e−n(1−p)Sl[n(1 − p)Sl](sl−1)
(sl − 1)!
·
e−npSr[npSr]sr
sr!
11which yields the exact same condition on the voter’s behavior. So we ﬁnd
that the statement of the Lemma holds true for g(n,η,p,τ) =
n(2p−1)
ln(
p
1−p)(Sl −
Sr) 
While we believe that our result extends to a set of distributions on the
voters of all 3 camps, it is important to note that the assumption of the
Poisson distribution is essential for the present proof to hold. Under the
assumption of the Poisson distribution a voter’s own own signal carries as
much information as anyone else’s. For other assumptions the case in which
the independent has not acquired any information diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
the alternative case in which he has acquired information.
In the next section on optimal communication we will formally show that
no extremists will ever send evidence that favors the opposing candidates or
τl(1,·,r,·) = τr(1,l,·,·) = 0. This implies that Sl = Sr and the independents
decision rule becomes vote for R if sr > sl, vote for L if sl > sr. 12
Sincere voting does not imply anything for the case that sl = sr +
g(n,η,p,τ). We assume that independent voters follow the coin throw of
the Supreme Court in this particular case.
We conclude this section by deﬁning the voting rules fl,fi,fr ∈ C3 by
fl(x) = L, fr(x) = R and fi(x) = L if sl > sr, fi(x) = R if sl > sr and
ﬁnally if sl = sr then fi(x) = R if and only if the publicly thrown coin came
up R. In the two preceding Lemmata 1 and 2 we have shown that in any
equilibrium proﬁle τ the voters will only follow these strategies. In short,
we have shown that τt1(·,·,·,ft1) = 1 for t1 ∈ {l,i,r}.
5 Optimal Communication
In this section we show that in equilibrium extremists will pass on signals
in their favor and suppress signals in favor of the other candidate. The
broadcasting behavior of the independents is determined by equilibrium as-
sumption 3: in equilibrium independents broadcast all signals. We will show
12An interesting comparison with Shin (1994) arises. The cutoﬀ x can be interpreted
as the burden of proof: if x is large the leftists face a large burden of proof, in the sense
that they need to provide more signals for any given amount of right signals to convince
an independent that L is the better candidate. This result is stronger than Shin’s as x
can be completely characterized in terms of n,p and τ.
12in section 8 that this assumption is consistent with strategic behavior. We
start this section by showing that extremists will never acquire information
without any plans to broadcast it.13
Lemma 3 In equilibrium we have that τl(1,∅,∅,f) = τr(1,∅,∅,f) = 0 for
all voting strategies f.
Proof Suppose in equilibrium some x = (1,∅,∅,f) was played with pos-
itive probability by the left wing extremists. As fl is a weakly dominant
voting strategy for left wing extremists we have that EUl(τ,x) ≤ EUl(τ,x∗)
for x∗ = (1,∅,∅,fl). Now consider the alternative strategy x0 = (0,∅,∅,fl),
which diﬀers from x∗ only insofar as that the voter does not acquire infor-
mation. Remember that a voter’s expected utility can be expressed as
EUt1(τ,y) = −δ(t1)Pr(L,r|τ,y) − (1 − δ(t1))Pr(R,l|τ,y) − cy1.
for t1 ∈ {l,r,i}. The signal acquired by the extremist is only known to him,
since this signal will never sway his vote we have that Pr(Y,ω|τ,y) does
not depend on this signal. So we obtain that EUl(τ,x∗) − EUl(τ,x0) = −c.
Consequently the voter strictly prefers x0 to x∗ and x, we must have that
τl(1,∅,∅,f) = 0 for all voting strategies f. An analogous argument holds
for right wing extremists. 
Note that this proof cannot be used to show that τi(1,∅,∅,f) = 0 in
equilibrium as the independents do not have a dominant voting strategy.
To analyze the optimal broadcasting strategies we need to ﬁnd out how
the broadcasts of l and r-signals change the winning probabilities of the two
candidates in the two states. We deﬁne Pr(E|τ,ω) as the probability that
event E occurs in state ω when all voters follow strategy τ. Let us assume
the stance of one particular voter, and let us deﬁne the events R and L
such that in these events candidates R and L win the election, when the
voter under consideration does not send a signal. Additionally we deﬁne the
events X + r (X + l) as the event that the candidate X wins the election
given that the voter sent an r (l)-signal .
13This result is reminiscent of some results in Degan (2006) and Oliveros (2006) insofar
as that given that information sending is never an option in their respective papers, both
obtain that extremists will never acquire information in equilibrium
13The eﬀect of an additional signal l or r being sent on the expected
utility comes through the eﬀect of that additional signal on the winning
probabilities of the two candidates in the two states. We deﬁne deﬁne ∆z
Y,ω
as the change in probability that candidate Y is being chosen in state ω
when another z signal is being sent. Formally
∆z
Y,ω := Pr(Y + z|τ,ω) − Pr(Y |τ,ω).
Observe that ∆r
R,ω,∆l
L,ω > 0. That is, observe that in either state the
probability that candidate Y wins is increasing in the number of signals sent
in his favor.
We are now ready to state and prove a Lemma about the equilibrium
information acquisition strategies of extremists
Lemma 4 In equilibrium we have that τl(1,·,r,fl) = τr(1,l,·,fr) = 0.
Proof Conditional on having received an l-signal the following holds true
for a left wing extremist. EUl(τ,x)−EUl(τ,x0) = p(Pr(L+l|τ,l)−Pr(L|τ,l)) =
p∆l
L,l > 0 for x = (1,l,·,fl) and x0 = (1,∅,·,fl). To see this observe that
the utility of a left wing extremist is always 0 in state r, so utility changes
only happen in state l. Given that the extremist has observed an l sig-
nal he thinks that state l is the true state with probability p. So any left
wing extremist strictly prefers sending an l signal strictly to being silent as
∆l
L,l > 0. Let us check next that no leftist extremist will send an r signal in
equilibrium. To see this observe that, conditional on having received an r
we have that EUl(τ,x)−EUl(τ,x0) = −(1−p)((Pr(R+r|τ)−Pr(R|τ,l)) =
−(1 − p)∆r
R,l < 0 for x = (1,·,r,fl) and x0 = (1,·,0,fl), so a left wing
extremist strictly prefers to stay silent. Analogous arguments hold for right
wing extremists. 
Lemma 4 together with equilibrium assumption 2 that τl(0,·,·,·) =
τr(0,·,·,·) implies that τl(1,l,∅,fl) = τr(1,∅,r,fr) as τl(0,·,·,fl) = 1 −
τl(1,l,∅,fl) and τr(0,·,·,fr) = 1 − τr(1,∅,r,fr). To save on notation we
say from now on that λ is the probability that an extremist acquires infor-
mation in the equilibrium strategy proﬁle τ. Lemmata 3 and 4 imply that
the extremists always pass one information that supports their case.
Lemma 4 together with the symmetry assumption also implies that Sl =
Sr and consequently the independents equilibrium rule for sincere voting
14becomes: vote for the candidate for whom more signals have been broadcast,
in short, g(n,p,τ) = 0. The symmetry of the equilibrium also implies that
∆r
R,r = ∆l
L,l and ∆l
L,r = ∆r
R,l. To save on notation we deﬁne ∆r
L,r = ∆l
R,l :=
∆+ as the increase in probability of a correct (or good) choice Y in state
ω = y given that another signal in favor of Y is being sent. Analogously we
deﬁne ∆l
L,r = ∆r
R,l := ∆− as the increase in the probability of wrong (or
bad) choice of candidate Y in state ω 6= y given that another signal in Y ’s
favor is being sent.
Economizing further on notation we say that π is the probability that an
independent acquires information in the equilibrium strategy proﬁle τ. Our
assumption that independents will share any signal they acquired implies
that τi(1,l,r,fi) = π.
We summarize that up until now we know that in any equilibrium τ
left wing extremists vote for the left candidate and right wing extremists
vote for the right candidate. Independents vote according to a very simple
cutoﬀ rule: if more l-signals have been published they vote for candidate
L, conversely if more r-signals have been published they vote for candidate
R, otherwise they base their vote on the coin of the Supreme Court. We
also know that extremists would only broadcast signals in their favor. We
show that our assumption that independents broadcast all their signals is
consistent with equilibrium in section 8. We are now ready to prove our main
result, namely the fact that in equilibrium that extremists never acquire less
information than the independents.
6 Extremists Are More Informed
Theorem 1 In an equilibrium the utility gain from acquiring information
for an extremist is always greater than that of an independent.
The intuition for this proof is simple. In any equilibrium τ the extremists
only broadcast information in their favor. A left wing extremist, for example,
would only broadcast an l signal. This reduces the probability that candidate
R is chosen in state l, at the same time this increases the probability of the
alternative mistake namely that candidate L is chosen in state r. A left
wing extremist does not care about the increase in the probability of the
15second mistake. An independent also broadcasts an l signal if he receives
one. However, diﬀerently from the extremists both eﬀects are felt for the
independent. The independent appreciates the fact that the probability of
an erroneous choice of R is being reduced. At the same time an independent
suﬀers from the fact that the additional l signal increases the probability that
L is chosen in state r.
Proof We compare the expected utility of right wing extremist voter for
the pure strategies xr = (1,∅,r,fr) and x0
r = (0,∅,∅,fr) to each other. From
the proof of Lemma 4 we know that a right wing extremist values a right
wing signal at p∆+. The acquisition of signal costs c, and the extremists
obtains a right wing signal with probability 1
2, so we obtain that:
EUr(τ,xr) − EUr(τ,x0
r) =
p
2∆+ − c.
Analogously we have for a left wing extremist, where xl = (1,l,∅,fl) and
x0
l = (0,∅,∅,fl):
EUl(τ,xl) − EUl(τ,x0
l) =
p
2
∆+ − c.
Finally let us investigate the utility diﬀerence for an independent, let xi =
(1,l,r,fi) and x0
i = (0,∅,∅,fi), we have that
EUi(τ,xi) = −
1
4
pPr(L + r|τ,r) −
1
4
(1 − p)Pr(R + r|τ,l)
−
1
4
(1 − p)Pr(L + l|τ,r) −
1
4
pPr(R + l|τ,l) − c
EUi(τ,x0
i) = −
1
4
pPr(L|τ,r) −
1
4
(1 − p)Pr(R|τ,l)
−
1
4
(1 − p)Pr(L|τ,r) −
1
4
pPr(R|τ,l)
So the expected utility diﬀerence between acquiring and not acquiring be-
comes:
EUi(τ,xi) − EUi(τ,x0
i) =
p
2
∆+ −
1 − p
2
∆− − c
<
p
2
∆+ − c = EUl(τ,xl) − EUl(τ,x0
l) = EUr(τ,xr) − EUr(τ,x0
r).
Where the inequality follows from the observation that ∆− > 0. We con-
clude that for any equilibrium strategy proﬁle τ information is more valuable
for extremists than for independents. 
16We observe in passing that the proof of Theorem 1 implies that the left
and right wing extremists beneﬁt equally much from the acquisition of in-
formation. Consequently the second assumption in our equilibrium concept,
namely that all extremists are equally likely not to acquire information is
consistent with our ﬁrst assumption on τ that all players are best respond-
ing.
Our model generates a positive correlation between information and ex-
tremism. We state this result as a simple corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 If the equilibrium probability that independents acquire infor-
mation is positive then all extremists acquire information in equilibrium.
If the equilibrium probability that an extremist acquires no information is
positive, then no independent acquires any information in equilibrium.
Proof We can express Corollary 1 as:
π > 0 =⇒ λ = 1 and λ < 1 =⇒ π = 0. (7)
Using the results derived in Theorem 1:
π > 0 ⇒ EUi(τ,xi) − EUi(τ,x0
i) = 0
⇒
p
2
∆+ −
1 − p
2
∆− = c
⇒
p
2
∆+ > c
⇒ EUl(τ,xl) − EUl(τ,x0
l) > c ⇒ λ = 1
and
λ < 1 ⇒ EUl(τ,xl) − EUl(τ,x0
l) = 0
⇒
p
2
∆+ = c
⇒
p
2
∆+ −
1 − p
2
∆− < c
⇒ EUi(τ,xi) − EUi(τ,x0
i) < 0 ⇒ π = 0

177 Sincere Voting is Strategic Voting
Equilibrium requirement 4 imposes that all voters vote sincerely in any equi-
librium τ. In section 4 we describe the sincere voting strategies of the three
voter types. It remains to be shown that no voter has an incentive to de-
viate from the sincere strategies given that all other voters vote sincerely.
In other words, it remains to be shown that Equilibrium requirement 1 is
consistent with sincere voting. We need to show that a voter that votes for
L following the sincere strategy, would like to vote for L if he knew that he
was the pivotal voter. For the extremists this is easy to see, as a left wing
extremists strictly prefers L to R in any case in which l could happen with
a positive probability.
It is somewhat more diﬃcult to see that an independent would like to
vote sincerely. Consider the case of an equilibrium strategy proﬁle τ and a
signal structure ~ s such that τ prescribes that independents votes L. If the
expected utility of R is higher than the expected utility of L given~ s and given
that the voter is pivotal then a strategic independent should vote R instead
of L. The crucial question is whether an independent who knows that he
is pivotal thinks that the state r is more likely than the state l. We will
show that the information contained in the pivotality event never overturns
the information in the public signal ~ s, in fact in most cases the information
in the event of being pivotal strengthens the information contained in the
public signal ~ s.
The intuition goes as follows: Suppose we have that sl ≥ sr, and that
the coin of the Supreme Court came up L (which is relevant only in the
case that sl = sr). All independents will vote L according to the strategy
proﬁle τ. An independent would be pivotal if L and R receive equally as
many votes. The fact that all independents vote for L implies that there
must be more right wing extremists in the electorate than there are left wing
extremists. Now consider the fact that more l signals have been sent. Taken
together this implies it is likely that more right wing extremists decided to
hide an l signal than there are a left wing extremist who hid an r signal.
The following Lemma will prove useful in this context.
Lemma 5 Suppose that Pr(l|~ n,~ s) ≥ Pr(r|~ n,~ s). Let ~ n0,~ s0 be such that
n0
r ≥ nr, n0
l ≤ nl, n0
i = ni, s0
r ≤ sr, s0
l ≥ sl and either ~ n0 6= ~ n or ~ s0 6= ~ s or
both, then we have that Pr(l|~ n0,~ s0) > Pr(r|~ n0,~ s0).
18Proof Observe that Pr(l|~ n,~ s) ≥ Pr(r|~ n,~ s) holds if and only if Pr(~ n,~ s|l) ≥
Pr(~ n,~ s|r). We proceed by distinguishing two cases: 1. π = 0 and 2. π > 0.
Case 1. In this case the signals sl,sr are drawn from binomial distribu-
tions B(nl,λp),B(nr,1−λp) in state l and B(nl,1−λp),B(nr,λp) in state
r. The inequality Pr(~ n,~ s|l) ≥ Pr(~ n,~ s|r) holds if and only if

nl
sl

(λp)sl(1 − λp)nl−sl

nr
sr

(λ(1 − p))sr(1 − λ(1 − p))nr−sr ≥

nl
sl

(λ(1 − p))sl(1 − λ(1 − p))nl−sl

nr
sr

(λp)sr(1 − λp)nr−sr ⇔

p
1 − p
sl−sr
≥

1 − λp
1 − λ(1 − p)
nr−nl+sl−sr
As 1 − λp > 1 − λ(1 − p) and p > (1 − p) we have that

p
1 − p
(s0
l−s0
r)
>

1 − λp
1 − λ(1 − p)
(n0
r−n0
l)+(s0
l−s0
r)
.
for s0
l−s0
r ≥ sl−sr and n0
r−n0
l ≥ nr−nl with at least one of the inequalities
strict. We conclude that Pr(l|~ n0,~ s0) > Pr(r|~ n0,~ s0) for ~ s0,~ n0 described in the
statement of the Lemma.
Case 2. The state l is more likely if more signals have been sent in its
favor. The independent needs to compare the total number of signals in favor
of l, s∗
l , with the total number of signals in favor of r, s∗
r. Not knowing these
numbers the independent can calculate the expected diﬀerence between the
two numbers for a ﬁxed ~ s,~ n as E(s∗
l −s∗
r|~ s,~ n); Pr(l|~ n,~ s) ≥ Pr(r|~ n,~ s) holds
if and only if E(s∗
l − s∗
r|~ s,~ n) ≥ 0.
Deﬁne si
l,si
r as the number of l and r signals sent by the independents.
Since π > 0, we have by Corollary 1 that all extremists acquire information.
Consequently every silent extremist hides a signal in favor of the opposite
candidate. We can calculate s∗
l ,s∗
r as:
s∗
l = sl + nr − (sr − si
r) s∗
r = sr + nl − (sl − si
l)
The expected diﬀerence becomes:
E(s∗
l − s∗
r|~ s,~ n) = E(2(sl − sr) + (nr − nl) + (si
l − si
r)|~ s,~ n) =
2(sl − sr) + (nr − nl) + E(si
r − si
l|~ s,ni)
19Clearly E(s∗
l − s∗
r|~ s,~ n) is increasing in nr − nl. The expression is also
increasing in sl−sr as an increase of sl−sr by 1 increases sl−sr by 2 while
it decreases E(si
r − si
l|~ s,~ n) by at most 1. 
Theorem 2 Equilibrium requirement 4 and 1 are consistent.
Proof Suppose that ~ s is such that τ prescribes for an independent to vote
L. Would this independent want to vote L if he knew that he was pivotal? In
other words, if T is the event that i is pivotal i.e. T = {~ n|nr = nl +ni,nr =
nl+ni+1}, is it true that Pr(l|~ s,T) ≥ Pr(r|~ s,T). We know from Lemma 5
that Pr(l|~ s,T) ≥ Pr(r|~ s,T) holds for all cases in which independents are
supposed to pick L if it holds for the case in which sl − sr and nr − nl
are being minimized given sl ≥ sr and the independent is pivotal, namely
sl = sr and nr −nl = ni. In the sequel we will only investigate this case and
show that the independent has an incentive to vote for L even in this worst
case scenario.
Case 1. By the argument given in the proof of Lemma 5 we know that
Pr(l|~ n,~ s) ≥ Pr(r|~ n,~ s) if and only if

p
1 − p
sl−sr
≥

1 − λp
1 − λ(1 − p)
nr−nl+sl−sr
Observe that for sl = sr and nr − nl = ni ≥ 0 the above in equality
always holds so we are done.
Case 2: By Lemma 5 we need to show that E(s∗
l − s∗
r|sr = sl,nr − nl =
ni) ≥ 0. Following the arguments given in the proof of Lemma 5 we can
calculate E(s∗
l −s∗
r|sr = sl,nr−nl = ni) as E(ni+si
r−si
l|sr = sl,nr−nl = ni).
If k out of the ni independents acquired information then we can cal-
culate a lower bound on E(si
r − si
l) = (1 − p)k − pk − 1 = (1 − 2p)k − 1
(assuming that the state is l, the independent under consideration observed
an l signal, and sl = sr > 2k which in turn implies that the constraint of
the total number of signals does not bind). This expression is bounded
from below by (1 − 2p)ni − 1 as k = 0,...,ni. So a lower bound for
E(ni+si
r−si
l|sr = sl,nr−nl = ni) is E(ni−ni(1−2p)−1) = n(1−2η)2p−1.
This expression is non-negative as n(1 − 2η) ≥ 1
2p ≥ 1 as was assumed in
the setup of the model.
20
8 Independents never want to acquire signals for
private use only
Equilibrium requirement 3 says that no independent would acquire a sig-
nal and not send it. The requirement states that τi(1,l,∅,f) = τi(1,∅,r,f) =
τi(1,∅,∅,f) = 0 for all f ∈ C2. In our solution we used this requirement.
We now need to show that no strategic voter would like to deviate from this
behavior. We need to show that EUi(τ,(1,∅,·,·)) ≤ EUi(τ).
Lemma 6 Equilibrium requirement 1 and 3 are consistent.
Proof We know from the prior section that:
∀f ∈ C2, EUi(τ,(0,·,·,fi)) ≥ EUi(τ,(0,·,·,f))
We will show
if ∃ f ∈ C2 s.t. EUi(τ,(1,∅,·,f)) ≥ EUi(τ,(0,·,·,fi))
⇒ EUi(τ,(1,l,.,fi)) > EUi(τ,(1,∅,.,f))
So (1,∅,.,.) is never a best reply for an independent. For this proof let
us assume the role of an informed independent, i∗, that has received an l
signal. Observe that there are ni − 1 other independents in the electorate.
We deﬁne ~ s∗ = (s∗
l ,s∗
r) as the vector of all public signals when i∗ does not
send his signal and ~ s∗ +l as the set of all signals available to voter i∗, which
consists of the signals sent by all voters but him and his own signal. Observe
that fi prescribes to vote L if s∗
l > s∗
r when i∗ does not send his signal and
s∗
l + 1 > s∗
r when i∗ does send his signal. In the sequel assume that f∗
maximizes EUi(τ,(1,∅,·,f)).
For EUi(τ,(1,∅,.,f∗)) ≥ EUi(τ,(0,.,.,fi)) we must have that f∗ 6= fi.
If these two would coincide then the independent would be strictly better
21oﬀ not to incur any cost for the private signal which he would never use.14
We know from Theorem 2 that sincere voting is strategic voting: If ~ s∗ and
(s∗
l + 1,s∗
r) yield the same voting recommendation under fi, then it must
be true that fi(~ s∗) = f∗(~ s∗ + l) . So we need to only consider the cases
in which the signal of the independent could possibly sway the vote of all
independents. This happens either if s∗
l = s∗
r or if s∗
l = s∗
r − 1.
In the case that s∗
l = s∗
r − 1 all independents except for i∗ will vote
R (fi(~ s∗) = R). Together with i∗’s signal l there would be equally many
signals in favor of each candidate. Observe that the same voting behavior
is prescribed if i∗ does not send his signal and i∗ publicizes his signal if
the supreme court issues a a recommendation to vote R. By Theorem 2 an
independent prefers to vote R in the latter case. So the independent would
prefer to vote R in the former case. We conclude that fi(~ s∗) = f∗(~ s∗+l). If
i∗ has an incentive to vote according to his private signal this must happen
when s∗
l = s∗
r.
Now let us look at the this case.15 In case the supreme court’s coin shows
L, i∗ would not want to deviate from the public recommendation to vote
L. So we only need to consider the case in which the Court’s coin shows R.
Since this is our last chance to ﬁnd a ~ s∗ such that fi(~ s∗) 6= f∗(~ s∗+l) it must
be true that f∗(~ s∗ + l) = L for s∗
l = s∗
r.
To fully understand the incentives of the privately informed voter we
need to ﬁnd out when this voter would be pivotal. In the case under study
all independents except for i∗ (ni − 1 independents) vote R. Without i∗’s
vote R receives nr + ni − 1 votes whereas l receives nl votes. Voter i∗ is
pivotal in exactly two cases namely nr + ni = nl and nr + ni = nl + 1
(Remember that we are only looking at the case in which the Court’s coin
came up R, so R wins the election in case of a tie). So we have found a
necessary condition for EUi(τ,(1,∅,.,f∗)) ≥ EUi(τ,(0,.,.,fi)) to hold. This
condition is that i∗ prefers L to R conditional on having himself an l signal,
s∗
l = s∗
r and nl−nr ∈ {ni−1,ni}. Using Lemma 5 we obtain that i∗ strictly
prefers L to R for nl−nr < ni−1 keeping all else (namely ~ s∗ and i∗’s signal)
14We used this argument in Lemma 3 to show that the extremists would never buy a
signal without any plans to send it.
15A plausible case in which i
∗ would have an incentive to vote according to the hidden
signal is that n is very small and sl = sr = 0. In this case it is very unlikely there there
are any other voters out there, so pivotality concerns do not matter much, i
∗ should follow
his signal
22equal.
We need to show next that if i∗ prefers L to R under the condition named
above, then he will prefer sending his signal l to keeping it secret. To show
this we need to ﬁrst identify the range of cases in which a switch from silence
to sending changes the outcome. As above for all ~ s∗ with either s∗
l > s∗
r or
s∗
l < s∗
r − 1 the outcome remains the same. So let us investigate how the
outcome changes in the remaining cases that s∗
l = s∗
r − 1 and s∗
l = s∗
r. As
before the case that s∗
l = s∗
r − 1 is easier to deal with, and we attack this
case ﬁrst.
If s∗
l = s∗
r − 1 and i∗ remains silent then all independents will vote
for R, by our arguments above we know that this includes the i∗. To the
contrary if i∗ publishes his signal a publicly thrown coin will decide whom
the independents will vote for. Under the assumption that s∗
l = s∗
r − 1
and that i∗ holds an additional l signal, the signals do not reveal anything
about the state of the world. The symmetry of the problem implies that the
decision whether to reveal the signal or not does not entail a utility change
for i∗.
So let us now have a look at the alternative case s∗
l = s∗
r. If the public
lottery directs the independents to vote for L, it does not matter whether
i∗ sends his signal or keeps it secret. So we only need to look at the case
that the public lottery directs all independents to vote R. In this case i∗
will sway the vote of the independents by sending his l signal. To evaluate
whether he should do so i∗ has to come up with a list of cases in which
his sending of the signal changes the outcome of the election (switch from
R to L). If i∗ does not send his signal the right wing candidate receives
ni + nr − 1 votes whereas the left wing candidate receives nl + 1 votes. On
the other hand if i∗ sends the signal the right wing candidate receives nr
votes whereas the left wing candidate receives nl + ni votes. The signal of
the independent is pivotal if nl − nr ≤ ni − 2 and nl − nr > −ni. In other
words the voter signal is pivotal if nl − nr ∈ {−ni + 1,....,ni − 2}. By our
above arguments we know that i∗ strictly prefers L to R for any single one of
these cases. It is therefore true that EUi(τ,(1,l,.,fi)) > EUi(τ,(1,∅,.,f∗))
for EUi(τ,(1,∅,.,f∗)) = maxf EUi(τ,(1,∅,.,f)) ≥ EUi(τ,(0,.,.,fi). An
analogous argument holds for the case that the independent observed an r
signal. 
239 Existence of Equilibrium
We have now reduced the problem of showing that an equilibrium exists to a
problem of showing that there exist probabilities of information acquisition
λ,π such that neither the extremists nor the independents would change
their information acquisition behavior given every one else’s information ac-
quisition behavior and that all voters follow τ after the information has been
acquired. For the proofs in this section it is convenient to deﬁne ∆+ and ∆−
as functions of the information acquisition probabilities. We write ∆+(π,λ)
and ∆−(π,λ) for the probability increases of the correct and incorrect choice
respectively being made when one more signal is being sent given that the
information acquisition probabilities of the independents and extremists are
π and λ.
Theorem 3 An equilibrium τ exists.
Proof Deﬁne a correspondence f : [0,1]×[0,1] → [0,1]×[0,1], by f = h◦g
with g being a function and g : [0,1] × [0,1] → R × R such that
g(π,λ) =
"
p
2∆+(π,λ)
p
2∆+(π,λ) −
(1−p)
2 ∆−(π,λ)
#
and h being a correspondence h : R × R → [0,1] × [0,1] with
hi(x,y) =

  
  
1 if g(x,y) > c
[0,1] if g(x,y) = c
0 if g(x,y) < c
Observe that g is continuous and h is upperhemicontinuous. So f is up-
perhemicontinuous. We conclude by Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem that a
ﬁxed point exists. 
The reason why we could not apply the existence result from Myerson
(1997) is that strategy spaces in our game are not ﬁnite since the set of voting
rules is inﬁnite. However, we reduce the our existence problem early on to
a problem that would ﬁt Myerson’s existence result. As soon as we know
that players will play ft1 in equilibrium, we could apply Myerson’s result.
The reason why we proved existence here is that this proof introduces the
necessary terminology for the a uniqueness discussion.
24We have a strong intuition that the equilibrium is unique. Indeed if
p
2∆+(π,λ) and
p
2∆+(π,λ)−
(1−p)
2 ∆−(π,λ) are strictly decreasing in π and λ
for the values that are consistent with corollary (1) we can show that there
exists a unique equilibrium. The intuition is most clear using a diagram.
By corollary (1) the only possible values of [π,λ] in equilibrium are π = 0
when λ < 1 and λ = 1 when π > 1. This allows us to consider π and λ
separately as in ﬁgure (??). The ﬁgure shows the values of λ and π for
all values of costs. The constant marginal cost of information acquisition
can cross these curves at most once if they are decreasing. If c does not
cross, either information is so cheap that everyone acquires the signal, it is
so expensive that no one acquires a signal, or it is between the extremist
and independent curves so that extremists always acquire and independents
never do. If c does cross one of the curves, that uniquely deﬁnes λ and π.
If it were the case that the extremists had no vote, but were just in-
formation gatherers we can show that this intuition is is indeed fact as the
∆ functions are decreasing (and look like the above ﬁgure). Unfortunately
once we attempt to take into account the small probability that an extremist
group outnumbers the rest of the electorate, manipulations of the ∆ func-
tion become intractable.16 To see this consider that just ∆+(π,λ) can be
written as:
∞ X
i=0
eNNi
i!
i X
j=0

i/2
j

ηj(1 − η)i/2−j
i−j X
k=0

i/2
k

ηk(1 − η)1/2−k
·[Pr(sl = sr|τ,i,j,k) + Pr(sl = sr − 1|τ,i,j,k)]
As such uniqueness is left uncertain.
10 Asymmetries
The model as well as the equilibrium concept contains a set of symmetry
assumptions. There are 3 symmetry assumptions in the model: The two
16It is tempting here to just assume that independents are always pivotal, in which case
we can show uniqueness. We believe this violates the whole essence of a model in which
all people have a vote, and may exaggerate the incentives of the voters.
25states are assumed to happen with equal probability, both signals are equally
strong, the expected share of right and left wingers is equal. In the solution
concept we impose two further symmetry assumptions: in equilibrium both
types of extremists are equally likely not to acquire information and the
independents will pass on both signals. What are these assumptions needed
for? How would the results change if we were to drop some (or all) of these
assumptions?
As an answer to the ﬁrst question observe that our proof that strategic
voters do not have an incentive to deviate from sincere voting depend our
symmetry assumptions. To see this consider an electorate in which there
are twice as many leftists as rightists on average. Consider the case of a
prior that slightly favors state l and assume that both signals are equally
strong and in equilibrium all extremists acquire information. Now let us
consider the case in which no signals have been sent: sr = sl = 0. A sincere
independent should vote for R. He should expect that there are about twice
as many leftists than rightists in the electorate. Since all extremists stayed
silent, this means that there are about twice as many right wing signals
than there are left wing signals. Since the prior favors l only slightly the
information contained in sl = sr = 0 should outweigh the prior. Now let
us reconsider this question from the point of view of a strategic indepen-
dent. Assume that the electorate is small and assume that independents
are “nearly never” born. So the pivotality event contains the information
that there are approximately equally many rightists and leftists. This im-
plies that they hide approximately equally many right and left signals. So
a strategic voter should vote according to the prior for L since sr = sl = 0
together with the pivotality event do not reveal any information about the
state of the world.
The consistency between Equilibrium requirements 1 and 3 and 4 will be
given for certain parameter ranges. Proofs of this would certainly messy. In
this section we follow a diﬀerent route. We complement the relaxation of the
symmetry assumptions with the imposition of two behavioral assumptions.
In this section we modify the model insofar as that we assume that voters
vote sincerely and that independents share all their information, we do not
require that these two assumption be compatible with strategic voting and
strategic information transmission. With these behavioral assumptions we
are able to establish a version of our main result for the case of asymmetric
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we need more notation. We will introduce all this information as part of
the setup of our the modiﬁed model. For brevity we refer the reader to the
prior sections for a discussion of our setup.
10.1 Asymmetric Model
Take the Poisson {Ω,α,T,n,p,C,U} game deﬁned in Section 2 and modify
it such that the common prior that the state is l is α ∈ (0,1). Assume that
p1(t1 = l|ω) = ηl, p1(t1 = r|ω) = ηr and ηl + ηr < 1 for ω ∈ {l,r} which
implies that any voter is a leftist with probability ηl and a rightist with
probability ηr. Finally let p2(t2 = l|ω = l) = pl; p2(t2 = r|ω = r) = pr, this
implies that the signals l and r might have diﬀerent strength as pr, pl can
be viewed as measures of their strength.
The prior model arises as a special case for α = 1
2, pl = pr, ηr = ηl
and the assumption that the electorate in “large” ((1−2η)n > 1). The last
assumption was only used to establish that independents have no strategic
incentive to deviate from sincere voting. We now have the behavioral as-
sumption of sincere voting. Consequently the assumption that the electorate
is large is no longer needed.
10.2 Strategies and Equilibrium
With the behavioral assumptions strategies can be described by shorter vec-
tors in the modiﬁed game. In fact the strategy of independents can be de-
scribed by their probability to acquire information π alone (their voting and
information sharing behavior is ﬁxed according to our modelling assump-
tion.) Strictly speaking the strategy vectors of extremists should have two
entries as we did not make any behavioral assumption on their information
sharing behavior. However, just as in the above model it is straightfor-
ward to show that extremists will always broadcast signals in favor of their
candidate and never broadcast signals in favor of the other candidate. We
therefore suppress this strategy variable and deﬁne the strategy of leftists
by λl the probability that leftists acquire information and λr respectively
for rightists.
We solve this game for an equilibrium following Myerson’s deﬁnition of
27an equilibrium in an extended Poisson game (Myerson 1998). So a vector
(λl,λr,π) is an equilibrium if no voter has an incentive to deviate from their
(information acquisition) strategy given everyone else’s (information acquisi-
tion) strategy. It is important to note that this deﬁnition of equilibrium does
allow for asymmetric strategies, we do not impose that λr = λl. Also note
that Myerson’s (Myerson 1998) equilibrium existence result applies directly
to the games in this family.
10.3 Solution
Voters are assumed to vote sincerely. Just as above this implies that all
extremists will vote for their preferred candidate. Let us calculate an asym-
metric analog of the independents cutoﬀ rule. Just as in the prior setup sr
and sl are Poisson distributed random variables in the current setup. The
parameters of sl and sr in states l and r are called xl
l,xr
l,xr
r and xr
l, where
the superscript denotes the state and the subscript denotes the signal:
xl
l = nηlλlpl + n(1 − ηl − ηr)πpl
xl
r = nηrλr(1 − pl) + n(1 − ηl − ηr)π(1 − pl)
xr
l = nηlλl(1 − pr) + n(1 − ηl − ηr)π(1 − pr)
xr
r = nηrλrpr + n(1 − ηl − ηr)πpr
So state l is at least as likely as state r if and only
α
e−xl
l[xl
l]sl
sl!
·
e−xl
r[xl
r]sr
sr!
≥ (1 − α)
e−xl
r[xl
r]sl
sl!
·
e−xr
r[xr
r]sr
sr!
Observe this holds expression if and only if
ln(
α
1 − α
) + xr
r + xr
l − xl
l − xl
r ≥ slln

xr
l
xl
l

− srln

xl
r
xr
r

Substituting in the values for xl
l,xr
l,xr
r and xr
l we obtain that
slln

pl
1 − pr

≥ ln(
1 − α
α
) + n(pr + pl − 1)(ηlλl − ηrλr) + srln

pr
1 − pl

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if α = 1
2, pl = pr, ηr = ηl and λr = λl. Let us now discuss this rule
in some detail: to make their decision the independents will multiply the
raw data sl,sr with factors ln

pl
1−pr

and ln

pr
1−pl

that reﬂect the relative
ease or diﬃculty to obtain l or r signals in either state. The larger is
pr
1−pl
the more meaningful are the r signals. In the expression the total amount
of r signals is multiplied by this indicator of the informativeness. In the
extremely noninformative case that pr = pl = 1
2 the signals are meaningless,
in this case the decision will be based on the prior alone, the above inequality
is either always true or never true, depending on the value of α.
If r is more likely following the prior more l-signals are needed to sway the
independents to vote L. This is reﬂected by the term ln

α
1−α

. Finally the
term n(pr+pl−1)(ηrλr−ηlλl) is equal to zero if ηrλr = ηlλl. In this case any
voter is equally likely to be either a right winger that acquires information or
a left winger that acquires information. In this case the only asymmetries in
the decision rule should be attributable to the prior (α) and to the diﬀerent
signal strength (the factors ln

pr
1−pl

and ln

pl
1−pr

as discussed above). If
this does not hold, say if ηrλr > ηlλl, then independents need more r signals
to be convinced in R’s favor, as there are on average more right wingers that
send such signals than there are left wingers. This intuition holds true as
ηrλr −ηlλl is multiplied by a positive factor n(pl +pr −1) in this equation.
As expected this factor depends on the average size of the electorate (n) and
a measure of the value of signals.
Recall that ∆z
Y,ω was deﬁned as the change in probability that candidate
Y is being chosen in state ω when another z signal is being sent. Just as in
the asymmetric case it is true that the probability that a candidate wins is
increasing in the number of signals sent in his favor: ∆l
L,ω,∆r
R,ω for ω = l,r
Without the various symmetry assumptions it is however not necessarily
true that ∆r
R,l = ∆l
L,r and ∆l
L,l = ∆r
R,r.
Following the arguments given in section 6 we can establish a weaker
version of the result that in equilibrium extremists have stronger incentives
to acquire information. We state this result as a separate Theorem.
Theorem 4 In an equilibrium the utility gain from acquiring information
for an independent is never greater than the utility gain of both extremists.
The proof follows along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1. It is
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Proof The utility of acquiring information for the right and left wing
extremists are respectively:
X =
p
2
∆r
R,r − c and Y =
p
2
∆l
L,l − −c.
Finally we calculate the utility of information acquisition for an inde-
pendent as
Z =
p
4
(∆l
L,l + ∆r
R,r) −
1 − p
4
(∆r
R,l + ∆l
L,r) − c =
X + Y
2
−
1 − p
4
(∆r
R,l + ∆l
L,r).
Finally observe that ∆r
R,l,∆l
L,r > 0 so we have that Z < X+Y
2 and it can-
not be true that both extremists receive a lower utility from information
acquisition than the independent does. 
Corollary 2 If the equilibrium probability that independents acquire infor-
mation is positive then at least one set of extremists extremists acquires
information in equilibrium. If the equilibrium probability that extremists
acquire no information is positive for both camps of extremists, then no in-
dependent acquires any information in equilibrium.
Proof In analogy to the proof of corollary 1 for the symmetric case. 
11 Conclusion
We believe the main contribution of this paper is to show that it is possible
to theoretically explain the information acquisition by extreme voters that
has been noted in the empirical literature. We also view this as an early
attempt to examine the eﬀects of communication in an electoral model. This
paper shows that a simple communication mechanism can signiﬁcantly alter
the predictions of a standard model in the literature, and believe that this
deserves more attention in future work.
The communication structure in this model is about as simple as we could
think of and could be enriched. One way to envision this is to add some
30form of search mechanism so that voters can then restrict their messages to a
random subset of the electorate. We believe that this would be interesting,
however it is not clear if it would change the results of the model. An
extremist would have less opportunity to convey their signal which would
decrease the incentive to obtain a signal. On the other hand, the incentive
to acquire would be increased by the fact each voter would now have less
information, so for an extremist each signal sent would carry more weight.
An application of this model to the media industry could provide some
insight into the documented bias of the media without making an assumption
about consumption value of information as in Bernhardt et al. (2006). One
could imagine a situation where signals are expensive and a market arose
for information in which it is cheaper for the voters to pay a few opposing
extremists to gather information than it is to pay an independent do it. This
may generate endogenous creation of biased media outlets.
Finally we believe that it would be useful to consider ways to join this
type of model to the results of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996). We know
that extremists tend to be better informed and the swing voters curse pre-
dicts that voters that are more informed are more likely to vote. This would
lead one to say that by the swing voters curse, extremists should end up vot-
ing more often. This claim would be veriﬁed by the data as this is another
major observation of Palfrey and Poole (1987), however the communication
model we have is not equipped to deal with voting abstention. It seems
that it would be a useful endeavor to attempt to examine abstention in this
framework.
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